For years, India’s policy toward the Indo-Pacific has been viewed through the lenses of the US and Quad. However, PM Modi’s July 6-11 tri-nation visits to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand indicate that New Delhi is quietly recalibrating its Indo-Pacific foreign policy independently. As a leading proponent of non-alignment and strategic autonomy, India strives to cultivate its national interests through robust bilateral ties rather than relying solely on regional and minilateral groupings. The US’s recent decision to revert the name of its Pacific Command from USINDOPACOM to USPACOM, removing the word ‘Indo’, could have prompted India to craft its own vision for the Indo-Pacific by identifying its strengths, opportunities, and challenges.
The visit is significant for India, particularly regarding China’s expanding footprint, which extends well beyond the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific to encompass India’s own backyard. For India, the visit came at a pivotal moment when Bangladesh secured China’s support for the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. The Teesta Barrage Master Plan was negotiated during Bangladesh PM Tarique Rahman’s June 2026 visit to China. Despite Bangladesh’s consistent claims of a development-led rather than a strategic approach, Chinese involvement in its river project raises major security concerns for India’s Siliguri Corridor, often dubbed Chicken Neck, and the entire Northeast region. Meanwhile, China’s land-swapping proposals to Bhutan, border infrastructure, and the construction of a dual-purpose village near the Doklam plateau are continuously pressurising Thimphu and causing security challenges for the Siliguri corridor. Beyond water management, the Teesta project is now a geopolitical issue for New Delhi, which Beijing could exploit to gain long-term strategic influence. Under these circumstances, India’s response to Chinese influence, from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean, is evolving from mere criticism and heated debate to a web of bilateral networks grounded in mutual respect, shared interests, and opportunities across various domains.
On the other hand, the timing of the visits is also significant for the Indo-Pacific region in light of China’s test-firing of a nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on July 6 in the Pacific Ocean, passing over the Philippines. The missile testing sparked alarm and drew condemnation from regional countries, including Australia, Japan and New Zealand. While China called it a routine drill, the missile test is an act of aggression and a heightening concern for the entire Indo-Pacific, as well as for the freedom of navigation in the region.
India’s tri-nation outreach represents its approach of expanding strategic itinerary and extending its neighbourhood beyond the Indian Ocean region to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Situating at the juncture of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia underscores an important space in India’s Act East policy and MAHASAGAR vision. The regional stability and safety of the Strait of Malacca, one of the largest choke points and a strategic sea lane of communication, also depend on Indonesia’s maritime security. As strong political and defence partners, India and Indonesia signed agreements to enhance cooperation in defence, critical minerals and rare earths, agriculture, space technology and maritime domain awareness.
Similarly, Australia has been a reliable partner in defence, technology, critical minerals, maritime security, and cybersecurity, as also demonstrated during the recent visit. Most importantly, the two countries signed and operationalised the long-pending administrative arrangement under the 2015 Civil Nuclear Cooperation agreement, enabling a full-fledged commercial supply of Uranium to India’s energy sector, under IAEA supervision. The deal is significant for India’s ambitious target of 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047. The deal also complements India’s SHANTI Act (Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India), allowing Australian mining companies to invest in and supply uranium to Indian private companies and joint ventures that can now build, own, and operate nuclear power plants. The Australia-India uranium supply negotiation underscores India’s commitment to conclude key areas through bilateral, trusted mechanisms. Apart from Australia, the conclusion on elevating India-New Zealand bilateral ties to a Strategic Partnership and on unveiling a Roadmap to 2030 demonstrates avenues for enhanced cooperation in trade, defence, maritime security, critical technologies, agriculture, tourism, and regional resilience.
Earlier, India hosted a high-level Japanese delegation led by PM Sanae Takaichi on July 2. During the event, the two countries signed their first defence co-development project and also adopted major documents on AI, metals, economic security, and energy resilience. Following this, the Indian delegation, led by defence secretary Rajesh Kumar, paid a bilateral visit to Tokyo for the 8th Defence Policy Dialogue, held on July 13, which focused on defence industrial collaboration, maritime security, and advancing a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific. Besides, it is worth noting that India, as confirmed by the defence secretary, has finalised the export of BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, whereas negotiations with Indonesia are in the final stage.
The series of engagements in Southeast Asia, the Far East and the South Pacific indicates that India is certainly evolving its vision towards a prosperous Indo-Pacific network. While Quad remains an important minilateral in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China’s assertiveness, India’s bilateral approach could build trust and serve as a parallel to strengthen its Indo-Pacific strategy without relying exclusively on a particular country or grouping. India’s move is not confrontational or a counter to China, but a strategic expansion of its outreach, beyond its traditional sphere of influence.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Mukesh Kumar, researcher, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), Sapru House, New Delhi.
