The Union government has suggested that to implement the women’s reservation Bill, the Lok Sabha be expanded by 50 per cent, or the total number of seats increased from 543 to 816 (a proposal to be considered during the special session of Parliament from April 16-18). This implies that this reservation will not displace current Lok Sabha members (as 272/816 equals one-third).
In this article, we spell out alternative methods of fair implementation of women’s reservation in Lok Sabha (and accordingly, for State Legislative Assemblies) without increasing the size of the Lok Sabha by 50 per cent. This article proposes a model that achieves a fair outcome while being the least cumbersome to implement.
If the Lok Sabha’s strength is to remain at 543
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin has indicated that the Lok Sabha should be frozen at 543 seats. If the total strength of the Lok Sabha remains fixed at 543, then the reservation has to come from within the existing seats. Alternative approaches could be as follows.
First, rotational reservation of constituencies. This would imply that about 181 constituencies (1/3 of 543) are reserved for women in each election. These reserved constituencies would rotate across subsequent elections. Male candidates cannot contest from reserved seats during that cycle. A variant of this rotational method is currently used to elect women to one-third of the seats in panchayats and urban local bodies, in accordance with the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 1992. However, there are risks to this approach. For one, it interrupts continuity of incumbents, potentially affecting their commitment to their constituencies and reducing accountability. It may also cause significant resentment against the women who replace male incumbents. In the last two houses, about 14-15 per cent of all Lok Sabha seats have elected women.
A second alternative is dual-member constituencies, i.e. some constituencies could elect two MPs instead of one. This could be more complicated to implement as it would require a redesign of the electoral system. The strongest argument against this idea is that it leads to unequal representation (with some seats having two representative and others only one).
A third method could be to mandate party-level candidate quotas by legislation (as has been the case in Pakistan for decades with some success and better outcomes for women). This means political parties will be required to field at least 33 per cent women candidates across constituencies. While this method may encourage broader systemic change in party structures, it cannot guarantee 33 per cent women MPs as it is dependent on election results.
A fourth method is proportional “top-up” seats (within 543). Thus, after elections, seats could be adjusted internally. In other words, if the current situation of 14 per cent representation of women in the 2024 Lok Sabha continues, then women would fall short of the 33 per cent target. In that case, some seats could be reallocated via party lists or nomination. However, this would complicate India’s current first-past-the-post system, which may raise constitutional and legitimacy concerns.
Thus, we can conclude that implementing any of these methods while maintaining the strength of the Lok Sabha at 543 poses serious problems.
A second variantto implement women’s reservation is to increase the size of the Lok Sabha, then establish a system of proportional representation to implement women’s reservation. However, proportional representation would only supplement the first-past-the-post system, not supplant it. It is feasible for India to add a layer of proportional representation alongside the current first-past-the-post system to achieve one-third women’s representation. This approach is much easier and more precise. Ensuring that it is “fair” will depend on how the hybrid system is designed.
In a proportional representation system, parties submit ranked candidate lists, and seats are allocated based on vote share. This allows for built-in gender balancing. What we propose is a mandatory “1/3 women in party lists” rule. In this system, the law would require at least 33 per cent of candidates on party lists to be women. Since proportional representation allocates seats from lists, this translates directly into seats.
The advantage of proportional representation
Under the first-past-the-post system (currently practised in the Lok Sabha) it is possible to reserve constituencies for women, but it disrupts voter choice, requires rotation, and cannot guarantee outcomes. Under proportional representation, by contrast, seat allocation is controlled at the list level, and gender quotas can be enforced mathematically and transparently.
The benefits of relying primarily on proportional representation are that we reach exactly 33 per cent or more, without blocking male candidates from specific constituencies, and it encourages parties to promote women systematically.
Another important advantage of proportional representation over first-past-the-post in a large, diverse and populous country such as India is that it ensures a better reflection of vote share in seat share, which is a huge improvement on the first-past-the-post system. How unfair the first-past-the-post can be is demonstrated by a few examples from recent general and State election outcomes.
We know that large dominant parties have historically opposed the proportional representation system. However, it should be public knowledge that barely one-fourth of all countries of the world have an exclusive first-past-the-post system. The first-past-the-post system, although adopted by India at Independence, following the British system,is now in a global minority (~25 per cent). In fact, it is proportional representation that dominates globally (~40 per cent+ and rising), while mixed systems (first-past-the-post + proportional representation) are increasingly popular (~20 per cent).
It is important for political leaders, especially from opposition parties, to realise that first-past-the-post seriously distorts electoral outcomes. In the 2014 general election, the BJP’s vote share was ~31 per cent but its seat share was ~52 per cent (282/543 seats). With just about one-third of votes, the BJP got a clear majority, while the Congress, with a vote share of ~19 per cent, obtained only ~8 per cent (44 seats). Thus, the Congress got 1/5th votes but much fewer seats.
Similarly, one State election example will suffice to show the degree of distortion that first-past-the-post can cause. In the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election, the BJP got a vote share of ~39.7 per cent, but its seats were as many as ~77 per cent (312/403 seats). Thus, the BJP appeared to win a landslide, landing up with 3/4th seats with just ~40 per cent votes. On the other hand, the combined vote share of the Samajwadi Party and Congress alliance was ~28 per cent, yet it obtained only 54 seats (amounting to 13 per cent).
Hence, a case can be made for first-past-the-post to be supplemented by using proportional representation. Of course, a concern could be that proportional representation could weaken the constituency link (a core feature of first-past-the-post in India) and grant party leadership greater power in deciding who gets elected. Indeed, this means that voters choose parties more than individuals. However, its great value lies in avoiding a full disruption of the current system, while ensuring representation of women, as we will show. More importantly, it ensures the fairness of vote share translating into seat share.
One alternative could be that there are reserved “top-up” proportional representation seats for women. This would mean that the existing 543 seats are left untouched by women’s reservation, preserving the first-past-the-post system as it is. Then, proportional representation seats are added to “top up” women’s representation to 33 per cent if shortfall exists. This is similar to the mixed systems in Germany and New Zealand (though not specifically for gender).
However, we propose an alternative method to implement first-past-the-post + proportional reservation systems together, below.
How first-past-the-post + proportional reservation system will work
What is proposed is that proportional reservation is applied only to ensure that India reaches 33 per cent seats for women. Assuming that the Lok Sabha will be expanded, proportional reservation will be applied only to the newly added seats. How this will work is discussed below.
First, an expansion of the Lok Sabha can be justified by population growth (India has not increased seats since the 1971 delimitation freeze). However, the size of the Lok Sabha should not increase inordinately, as the Centre recommends, to 816 seats, the logic for which has never been explained by its proponents. That would make the Lok Sabha into a political rally, not a parliament of the largest democracy in the world. Parliament requires a manageable Lok Sabha to debate issues of national importance. The largest lower house of parliament in the world is probably the UK (at 650).
Hence, we suggest an increase to 651 seats. This ensures that the Lok Sabha gets 216 women MPs (or 33 per cent of 651). If half this number of 216 (i.e. 108) was to be elected using the first-past-the-post system, then the remaining 108 can be elected using proportional reservation in the expanded Lok Sabha (651-543 = 108). Thus, we need to add only 108 seats to India’s expanded parliament of 651 members, with half of the women elected from constituencies (i.e., 108 based on first-past-the-post, as now), and the remaining half (also 108) based on proportional reservation-based party lists.
Of course, in a federal country, we need to take a call on whether the party lists of women under the proportional reservation system will be at the national or State-level. Selecting women candidates at the State level is more federal in nature and likely more acceptable. This would require a Constitutional amendment alongside reforms similar to the Women’s Reservation Bill.
We now proceed to estimate how it works for a Lok Sabha of 651 seats.
We reiterate that it is highly inappropriate to have a Lok Sabha that is larger than 651 members. This size itself is too large for proper debate unless the number of days of Lok Sabha sessions in a year are not increased commensurately, going back to levels prevailing in the 1950-1975 period, when Parliament met for 135-140 days a year. By the early 1990s, this dropped to 95-100 days. The most drastic drop has occurred since the mid-2010s, falling to only 55-65 days.
Next, to implement the arrangement, India would need a carefully designed hybrid system. First, it needs to amend Article 81 (Composition of Lok Sabha), and increase the cap from 543 to 651 seats. Also, it will be required to modify the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, and explicitly allow mixed electoral system (first-past-the-post + proportional reservation), as well as State-level proportional allocation, and link it with the Women’s Reservation Bill.
Whether we need to amend the Representation of the People Act depends on how the Delimitation Commission proposes women will be elected to first-past-the-post seats. For example, there could be a provision for introducing a dual voting system, in which each voter gets a Constituency vote (first-past-the-post) and a Party vote (for proportional reservation seats). Moreover, each party submits a State-wise ranked list of women candidates for the State-level party vote. Further, no delimitation will be needed to redraw constituencies for half the seats for women (the 108 first-past-the-post ones, in our schema), if the present fi rst-past-the-post continues for these 108 constituencies.
Then, there is the question of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) reservation, and how that intersects with women’s reservation. In the current Lok Sabha (total 543 seats), reservation is as follows: the SC have 84 seats and ST have 47 seats. The total reserved seats (SC + ST) are 131. Presumably, one-third of both SC and ST seats will be allocated to women. SC/ST reservation will need to apply to the proportional reservation portion of the Lok Sabha; otherwise, their share will drop in the Lok Sabha.
All political parties will, one hopes, consider these proposals in the national interest. There could be an intersection between SC/ST and women’s reservation, and in principle, there are two ways to integrate them. The first is “parallel quotas” (simple), not overlapping between women’s reservation and SC/ST. That way, there are no sub-quotas required, and SC/ST representation remains unchanged. The second is “nested quotas” (more socially balanced) to ensure representation of SC women and ST women within their respective totals: (~28 seats for SC women; and ~16 for ST women).
Thus, we will count SC/ST women elected in first-past-the-post and use proportional reservation seats to top up SC/ST women specifically. SC/ST quotas should extend into proportional reservation seats. Parties would submit three lists: a general women list; an SC women list; and an ST women list. The legal architecture will need to align with the Constitution and Election Commission rules.
All political parties will, one hopes, consider these proposals in the national interest.
Santosh Mehrotra is a former Professor of Economics, JNU.
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